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THE U.S. EPA 40 C.F.R. PART 258 FINANCIAL
TEST/CORPORATE GUARANTEE

-

NEW

ENVIRONMENTALLY PROTECTIVE, COSTEFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR THE
DEMONSTRATION OF FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
John H. Turner*

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") recently
amended the 40 C.F.R. Part 258 regulations applicable to municipal solid waste landfills' ("MSWLFs") by adding two new financial assurance mechanisms for the demonstration of financial responsibility pertaining to closure, post-closure maintenance, and
corrective action. 2 This Article discusses the new mechanisms and
the reasons why state environmental agencies3 should incorporate them into their regulations so as to make the mechanisms

* The author is Divisional Vice-President, State Government Affairs, Browning-Ferris Industries. B.S., University of Alabama; J.D., Vanderbilt University. The views expressed in this Article are those of the
author.
1. See Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and
Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg.
17,706 (1998). For a general discussion of the 40 C.F.R. Part 258 regulations and their implementation by state environmental agencies, see
John H. Turner, Off to a Good Start: The RCRA Subtitle D Program for
Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1 (1996).
See also John H. Turner, Solid Waste Regulation Under RCRA, 9 NAT. RES.
& ENV'T 6 (1994); Note, The New Federal Standards for Municipal Solid
Waste Landfills: Adding Fuel to the Regulatory Fire, 3 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 383
(1992).
2. The promulgation of the new mechanisms (the financial test
and corporate guarantee for use by private owners/operators of
municipal solid waste landfills) amended 40 C.F.R. § 258.74 ("Allowable
mechanisms") by revising paragraphs (e), (g), and (k).
3. The 40 C.F.R. Part 258 program is primarily applied by states
whose regulatory programs have been approved by the EPA. See Turner,
Off to a Good Start, supra note 1, at 34-63.
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available to qualified private municipal solid waste landfill owners/operators.
Financial assurance requirements should be designed to ensure, through reasonable and cost-effective methods, that responsible parties assume the costs of closure and post-closure or
remediation activities, and not transfer those costs to third parties (i.e., the general public) as a result of bankruptcy or
4
insolvency.
The history of the financial test under the federal legislation
pertaining to waste disposal5 is addressed in Part I. Part II of this
Article briefly describes the role of the financial assurance mechanisms under United States environmental laws and examines
the importance of a cost-effective "self-assurance" mechanism,
the "financial test." Part III describes the EPA corporate financial
test/corporate guarantee and argues why the Part 258 EPA corporate financial test/guarantee should likewise be made available
for use by qualified facility owners/operators, particularly if the
EPA-endorsed financial test for local governments is incorporated
6
into state regulations.

4. See, e.g., Gary B. Cohen & Daniel L. Derkics, FinancialResponsibility for Hazardous Waste Sites, 9 CAPITOL U.L. REv. 509 (1980).

5. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6902(a), 6907, 6912(a), 6944, 6945(c), and 6949a(c) (1994).
6. State agencies which conduct 40 C.F.R. Part 258 programs are
not required by federal law or regulation to incorporate either the financial test and corporate guarantee financial assurance mechanisms
or the Part 258 local government financial test into their regulations.
They are, however, required to maintain a financial assurance program
that is at least as stringent as the Part 258 standards. As will be noted
elsewhere in this Article, several states (particularly those with financial
assurance responsibility programs that pre-date the promulgation of
the Part 258 standards in 1991) have existing regulatory standards that
utilize the less cost-effective financial test developed by the U.S. EPA
for use in the Subtitle C hazardous waste program. A few other jurisdictions have statutory impediments to the use of the new EPA mechanisms by private owners or operators of municipal solid waste landfills.
Most states have incorporated the EPA Part 258 financial test for local
governments.
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1. THE BAsIc PROVISIONS OF THE RCRA AND EPA 40 C.F.R. PART
258 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM
A number of federal environmental statutes employ financial
responsibility standards. The Clean Water Act,7 the Deepwater
Port Act,' the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 9 the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Recovery Act, 10 the Price-Anderson Act," and the Motor Carrier Act
of 198012 - all reference financial responsibility mandates.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")1 3 also
seeks to provide that adequate funds are available to close waste
management facilities properly, care for them after closure, undertake necessary corrective action, and compensate for releases
from those facilities. The statutory financial responsibility requirements are intended to force owners and operators of waste
management facilities to recognize and "internalize" the costs of
third-party liability and site closure, post-closure, and cleanup
costs so that public funds will not have to be called upon to
cover these costs.
A.

The RCRA Subtitle C Requirements

The EPA first implemented RCRA-mandated regulations with
regard to "Subtitle C" hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities. 14 Section 3004 of Subtitle C of RCRA requires
the EPA to promulgate standards creating performance standards
applicable to hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal fa-

7. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (p)(1) (1982).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(1) (1982).
9. 30 U.S.C. § 1257(f) (1982).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a)-(b) (1994).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994).
12. 49 U.S.C. § 10927 (1995).
13. See RCRA § 4010(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6949(c) (1988).
14. While the statute contains a provision mandating the EPA to
require "financial responsibility" as may be "necessary or desirable"
with regard to hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, it neither defines the term "financial responsibility" nor specifically mandates that the Agency develop and enforce minimum financial responsibility requirements under the Subtitle D (solid waste
disposal) program.
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cility owners/operators as may be necessary to protect human
health and the environment. Section 3004(a)(6) mandates that
the standards shall include requirements concerning "the maintenance of operation of such facilities and requiring such additional qualifications as to ownership, continuity of operation ...
and financial responsibility . . . as may be necessary or desirable."15 Congress provided that financial responsibility may be
demonstrated by a variety of mechanisms, including "any one of
any combination of the following: insurance, guarantee, surety
bond, letter of credit, or qualification as a self-insurer. ' 16 The
EPA has, since 1980, consistently endorsed the use of a number
of different mechanisms, including a "self-assurance" financial

test. 17
In 1978, the EPA proposed a number of financial assurance
regulations that would have implemented the statutory provision
by mandating that facility owners/operators use trust funds as
the sole mechanism for the demonstration of financial responsibility."8 The EPA responded to comments that the limitation of financial responsibility mechanisms to trust funds would be burdensome and unnecessary by adding a number of alternative
mechanisms, including a financial test, in a revised proposal issued in 1980.19 The proposed test included several financial criteria which, if "passed," would allow an owner or operator to
demonstrate financial responsibility without actually setting aside
funds in a trust fund or obtaining a third-party guarantee of an
available source of funds.
The 1980 proposal generated a significant number of additional responses, many of which urged the Agency to examine
other possible criteria for the demonstration of financial responsibility. In response, the Agency examined several alternative financial tests and promulgated one for closure and post-closure

15. RCRA § 3004(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6) (1994).
16. RCRA § 3004(t)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(t)(1).
17. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Management System, 50 Fed. Reg.
28,702, 28,734 (1985).
18. See, e.g., Financial Assurance Requirements, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,006
(proposed Dec. 18, 1978).
19. Financial Requirements for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,260 (1980).
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care in an interim final rule of April, 1982.20 In addition, the
EPA promulgated a Subtitle C financial test for third-party liabil21
ity coverage.
Under the Subtitle C regulations, 22 owners and operators can
satisfy financial responsibility requirements by several different
mechanisms (or a combination thereof), including the establishment of a trust fund, 23 obtaining a surety bond from a company
listed as acceptable in U.S. Treasury Circular 570,24 obtaining an
irrevocable standby letter of credit from a state or federally "regulated and examined" institution (i.e., a bank), 25 by purchasing
insurance from an insurance or surplus lines company, 26 or by
"self-insurance" (i.e., a financial test) if certain financial criteria
can be satisfied.

27

20. See 40 C.ER. pts. 264(h), 265 (h) (1982) (Permitted and interim
status facilities respectively).
21. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 123, 264, 265 (1982); see also 40 C.F.R. pts.
264, 265, 280, 761 (1991).
22. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
("HSWA") added Subtitle I to RCRA, regarding the creation and implementation of a regulatory program for underground storage tanks
("USTs") containing petroleum or certain other substances. Sections
9003(c) and (d) of Subtitle I were further amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA") to require the
EPA to promulgate financial responsibility requirements for UST owners and operators. See, e.g., Underground Storage Tanks Containing Petroleum, 55 Fed. Reg. 24,692 (1990).
23. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.143(a), (b) (closure), 264.145(a), (b)
(post-closure); see also 265.143(a), (b) (closure), 265.145(a), (b) (postclosure) (1998).
24. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.143(c) (closure), 264.145(c) (post-closure);
cf. 265.143(b) (closure), 265.145(b) (post-closure) (Note that in

§§265.143(b) and 265.145(b) the surety bond is used to guarantee "payment into a closure trust fund"(§§ 265.143(b) and 265.145(b)), rather
than to guarantee "performance of closure" or "performance of postclosure care" (§§ 264.143(c) and 264.145(c)); however, in both cases a
standby trust fund is required.
25. See 40 C.ER. §§ 264.143(d) (closure), 264.145(d) (post-closure);

see also 265.143 (c) (closure), 265.145 (c) (post-closure).
26. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.143(e) (closure), 264.145(e) (post-closure);
see also 265.143 (d) (closure), 265.145 (d) (post-closure).
27. See 40 C.ER. §§ 264.143 (f) (closure), 264.145(f) (post-closure);
also
265.143(e) (closure), 265.145(e) (post-closure).
see
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In order to satisfy the requirements of the Subtitle C financial
test, a company must either have: (1) a) a net worth of $10 million, b) a net worth and tangible net worth both at least six
times the amount of coverage sought, c) satisfaction of one of
three financial ratios, and d) at least 90% of assets (or six times
the amount of liability coverage) located in the United States; or
(2) a) a current investment quality bond rating, and b) net
worth of at least $10 million and six times the amount of liability
28
coverage located in the United States.
B.
The 1988 EPA Subtitle D Proposed Regulations
In 1988, the EPA proposed regulations to implement Subtitle
D of RCRA by drafting design and operating requirements for
municipal solid waste landfills as well as to provide financial assurance for closure, post-closure care, and corrective action. 29 In
the proposal, the Agency did not specify particular mechanisms
for the demonstration of financial assurance.30 Instead, the EPA
recommended a "performance standard" that any selected mechanism would be required to satisfy.3 1 The "preamble to the pro-

28. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.143 (f) (closure), 264.145(f) (post-closure);
see also 265.143(e) (closure), 265.145(e) (post-closure).
29. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314
(1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258) (proposed Aug. 30
1988).
30. Id. at 33,314.
31. The EPA noted that:
The proposed rule would not specify the types of financial
assurance mechanisms allowed. Instead, the proposal specified in Section 258.32(e) a performance standard for a financial assurance program that must be satisfied to demonstrate
compliance with the financial assurance requirements under
Sections 258.32(f), (g), and (h). The performance standard
was designed to ensure that mechanisms allowed by the
States (e.g., trust funds, letters of credit, State Funds, etc.)
would satisfy the overall goals of financial assurance. As proposed, the performance standard would permit States to authorize use of financial mechanisms that met five criteria: (1)
ensure that the amount of funds assured is sufficient to
cover the costs of closure, post-closure care, and corrective
action for known releases when needed; (2) ensure that
funds will be available in a timely fashion when needed; (3)
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posed rule noted that the financial assurance mechanisms currently authorized under Subtitles C and I, if properly drafted,
would satisfy these performance criteria."32 While "[a] number of
commenters agreed with the EPA's decision to not specify the
types of financial assurance mechanisms that would be allowed . . . many other commenters expressed a concern that
the performance standard lacked sufficient detail to guide States
in the development and implementation of the financial assur33
ance requirements with any consistency among States.
Some commenters 34 raised the possibility that states would simply incorporate mechanisms into their solid waste landfill regulations that were then approved by the EPA for use by Subtitle C
facilities without consideration of the relative merits and disadvantages of those mechanisms. In particular, by 1988, experience
under the Subtitle C rules had demonstrated the limited usefulness of the surety bond, letter of credit, and insurance options.
For example, it was noted 35 that the money required for closure
and post-closure care is paid into an account which creates a closure and post-closure trust fund. Payment could be made over
the operating life of the facility or the life of the permit, whichever is shorter.

guarantee the availability of the required amount of coverage
from the effective date of these requirements or prior to the
initial receipt of solid waste, whichever is later, until the
owner or operator is released from financial assurance requirements under Sections 253.32(f), (g), (h); (4) provide
flexibility to the owner or operator for demonstrating compliance with the financial assurance requirements; and (5)
be legally valid, binding and enforceable under State and
Federal law.
Solid Waste Disposal Facilities Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 51,114
(1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258) (proposed Oct. 9,
1991).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Rulemaking Docket Number F-91-CMLF-FFFFF, RCRA Docket
Information Center, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
35. Solid Waste Disposal Facilities Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978,
51,114 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258) (proposed Oct.
9, 1991).
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Money paid into the trust fund account was guaranteed to be
available whenever closure occurs. The owner/operator, however, lost the "use" of that money for other purposes, such as operating costs or corporate growth. This loss of available funds
could not be tolerated by many small companies. Allowing payment into the fund during the life of a site provided a diminished level of security regarding funds actually available should
the trust fund be called upon to fund closure.
Although there was a high degree of assurance that funds deposited into the trust would be available, the amount of funds
available prior to the close of the "pay-in" period was less than
other mechanisms that guarantee the full coverage from their inception. Thus, there was an intrinsic imbalance, to the substantial, and probably unjustifiable advantage of the trust fund option in terms of when the full burden was imposed. Put simply,
there was a lower level of environmental protection until the
"pay-in" period was completed.
It was also noted 36 that it might be financially unwise to structure payments into trust funds with specified dollar targets at defined times, as a portion of the target amount. This was because
the cash in the fund had value, and the fund holder might invest funds and realize a gain on the investment. It was argued
that the proper pay-in calculation would discount the amounts to
be paid in, in order to reach the cash target on time, recognizing the fund growth over time.
With regard to surety bonds, commenters noted37 that the Subtitle C rules allowed a waste management facility to demonstrate
financial responsibility by obtaining a surety bond to guarantee
that either the full cost of closure and post-closure care would be
paid into a trust fund upon demand or that closure and postclosure care would be performed when the bond holder (usually
a government agency) so requires. Although this mechanism
seemed straightforward, commenters stressed 38 that it was not
free from difficulty. For example, it was observed that the obliga-

36. See, e.g., KEYSTONE
at 6-7 (1989).
37. See id. at 7.
38. See id.

REPORT,

CTR., FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PROJECT, FINAL
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tion of the surety company under either type of bond was extensive - the time period included the operating life plus the entire closure and post-closure periods, which could have been
indefinite under the proposed Subtitle D criteria. In 1988, it was
very difficult to obtain a surety bond guaranteeing an obligation
for more than one year. Bonds for very long-term obligations
were virtually unavailable, or available only at a price that most
owners/operators would not contemplate paying.
Sureties were also very reluctant to issue bonds guaranteeing
commitments related to the environment. 39 The circumstances of
the commitment were carefully examined by the surety, and
bonds were awarded only at a relatively high cost. In addition,
before issuing either type of bond, sureties carefully scrutinized
the applicant's total liabilities.40 Accordingly, the use of the surety
bond mechanism was very limited.
The EPA also accepted letters of credit as proof of a company's ability to meet closure and post-closure care costs for Subtitle C facilities. Some states preferred the use of this mechanism. 4' A letter of credit is essentially a guarantee by a financial
institution (most often a bank) that it will cover an obligation for
a customer. The institution, in essence, gave the owner/operator
a loan in the amount of the closure/post-closure care costs, and
required collateral from the owner/operator to secure the loan.
If the owner/operator had a line of credit with the institution,
that line was reduced by the amount of the letter of credit. This
diminished the amount of money available to the owner/operator for other purposes, such as operation of the business or new
acquisitions. In some cases, the owner/operator was more financially stable than the financial institution issuing the letter of
credit. The limitations associated with the letter of credit mechanism, the commenters claimed, made it of diminished utility as a
42
financial assurance mechanism.

39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 6.
42. Petition of the National Solid Wastes Management Association
to Initiate a Proceeding to Revise Financial Assurance Criteria and
Mechanisms, at 21, Feb. 16, 1990.
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In 1988, the market for commercially-issued insurance in the
environmental area, including for the demonstration of closure
and post-closure care costs, was barely developed.4 1 In any event,
the known costs of closure and post-closure care were not considered to be amenable to standard insurance policy writing
practices. Policies are generally written to cover losses that may
or may not occur - not known costs. Due to the reluctance of
insurance companies to write such policies, this mechanism was
likewise considered to be essentially unavailable to owners/operators. The few policies that could be obtained at that time were
expensive for smaller owners/operators. 4"
Commenters also emphasized that the Subtitle C financial test,
as it then existed, would also be of limited utility if it were applied to Subtitle D municipal solid waste landfills.4 5 For example,
a comparison of costs estimated for a company with one landfill
and a company with forty landfills 46 revealed that the one-landfill
company would be required to possess a tangible net worth of at
least $109,800,000.00 in order to use the financial test to demonstrate financial responsibility. A company with forty landfills
would have been obligated to have a tangible net worth of at
least $4,320,000,000.00.
Accordingly, commenters were concerned that in the absence
of criteria developed specifically for use in the Subtitle D program, the goals of the financial assurance provisions-ensuring
environmental protection through the conduct of acceptable closure and post-closure care at landfills and the avoidance of adding to the number of Superfund sites nationwide-would not
be met if the requirements could effectively not be satisfied by
the majority of the owners/operators of solid waste management

43. See KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 36 at 5.
44. See, e.g., SOLID WASTE REPORT, Jan. 22, 1998, at 27.
45. See Petition of the National Solid Wastes Management Association to Initiate a Proceeding to Revise Financial Assurance Criteria and
Mechanisms, at 8-9, Feb. 16, 1990.
46. The estimates included several assumptions, among them that
only "Phase I" groundwater monitoring would be involved, that the
size of the permitted landfill would be seventy-five acres, and that only
25 groundwater monitoring wells would be required for the 75 acre facility-estimates that were considered to be conservative in nature.
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facilities. It was also noted that: a) it is very unlikely that one
owner will have to close all, or even many, of its facilities at one
time; b) costs increase as landfills grow in size up to a point,
then decrease as the landfill closure is accomplished and thereafter; and c) only the very largest owners/operators could satisfy
the Subtitle C financial test "tangible net worth" requirement.
C.

The Keystone Center's FinancialResponsibility Project

The following year, the Keystone Center's Financial Responsibility Project, convened as a "dialogue involving participants
from diverse groups concerned with how various approaches for
providing responsibility to meet Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") requirements can be improved," 47 issued its
final report. The Project identified several concerns regarding
the Subtitle C financial test:
(1) The current financial test is not performing optimally as
a financial assurance mechanism. First, it does not appear to be
as good a bankruptcy predictor as anticipated by the Agency
(i.e., more firms than anticipated are able to pass the test that
later go bankrupt). Second, the test is not as available as the
Agency predicted to viable firms (fewer firms that do not go
bankrupt are able to pass the test than predicted). In its efforts
to develop a new test, the Agency should consider focusing its
efforts on improving the ability of the test to screen out future
bankrupt firms while maximizing, to the extent possible, the usage of the test by viable firms.
(2) The degree to which the test measures the availability of
funds to meet potential obligations is also an important consideration. However, the aspect of the current test intended to
serve this purpose, the "six times" multiplier for net worth and
net working capital, appears to have weak analytical underpinnings and, more importantly, plays a major role in reducing
the availability of the test to viable firms. In assessing potential
financial tests, the Agency should consider examining other
levels of multipliers as well as alternative measures of availability
of funds in order to improve the performance of the test.
(3) Costs are important in examining potential financial tests
on two levels. First, the costs of a financial test (i.e., the private
costs of purchasing other mechanisms if the test is not available, plus the public costs of covering obligations of bankrupt

47. See

KEYSTONE CTR.,

supra note 36, at 1 (1989).
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firms) should be taken into consideration in determining the
test that best satisfies the objectives discussed in (1) and (2)
above. Second, the costs of closure, post-closure care, and corrective action should be estimated as accurately as possible so
that measures of availability of funds to meet these costs may
be properly evaluated.
(4) In structuring the financial test, the Agency should consider the degree of consistency between programs. For example, the proposed financial test for owners and operators of underground storage tanks containing petroleum differs from the
RCRA financial test. However, the Dialogue group recognized
that consistency does not mean absolute similarity as the underlying rationale for the respective tests may vary with the goals of
48
particular programs.
In addition, the group identified the objectives of a financial
test:
(1) Minimize the availability of the financial test to firms that
are likely to go bankrupt. The test should be able to predict,
with a high degree of confidence, that firms that will enter into
bankruptcy in the near future should not be able to pass the financial test. This objective is sometimes referred to as the
"bankruptcy predictor." There are several components of the
current financial test which are intended to meet this objective:
several minimum financial ratios or bond ratings and a minimum level of tangible net worth must be met.
Achievement of this objective can be evaluated statistically
against samples of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. The accuracy of any specific financial test is measured in terms of the
percent of bankrupt firms which are able to pass the financial
test.
(2) Maximum availability to firms least likely to go bankrupt.
Firms that are viable, ongoing, and financially secure and stable
operations should be able to assure their financial responsibility
obligations based on their internal resources. This objective
may conflict with the bankruptcy prediction objective in that
maximizing availability increases the risk that bankrupt firms
may pass the test. Achievement of this objective can also be
evaluated statistically against historic information and assumed
obligations, and measured as a percentage of non-bankrupt
firms which are able to pass the financial test.
(3) Ensure availability of funds. Even if the bankruptcy predictor achieves a high level of confidence in screening out

48. Id. at 10.
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bankrupt firms, an additional measure of availability of funds
may be needed.
(4) The financial test must be simple and relatively easy to
implement. This should be true both from the perspective of
the regulators and the regulated community. This objective can
be met not only by decreasing the degree of detail in the tests,
but also by simplifying the format of the test and/or using stan49
dard forms.
While the Keystone report did not directly give rise to regulatory
initiatives, it helped to establish criteria for evaluation of the
Subtitle C test and emphasized the need for a more cost-effective
and available, yet predictive, standard. 0

49. Id. at 11-13.
50. The Keystone report also noted that the use of financial ratios,
which "are often used in the financial community to evaluate firms because they reveal the performance of the firm relative to other firms in
a particular industry," id. at 13, might include but not be limited to leverage ratios and profitability ratios.
Leverage ratios generally compare debt, particularly longterm debt, to equity. Such ratios may also compare cash from
operations to interest expense. These ratios provide a longer
term look at whether a firm can meet its obligations and/or
whether or not it is profitable enough to generate sufficient
capital from equity and/or debt. This is also important in
predicting bankruptcy, particularly when the underlying financial responsibility obligations are of a long-term nature. . . . Profitability ratios generally compare net or pretax income to revenue, assets, or equity. The goal of these ratios is to determine how profitable a firm is. How successful
a firm is in generating profits, particularly in comparison to
prior years, is also important in establishing that a firm will
remain solvent and in business.
Id. at 14. The Report emphasized that "[t]he financial test may include
a combination of some or all of the various types of ratios. Having various combinations of ratios will also help meet the objective of maximizing availability to non-bankrupt firms by avoiding placing too much
emphasis on any one ratio or type of ratio." Id. at 15. The Report also
noted the important role of bond ratings, stating that:
[t]hese ratings are fairly reliable for several reasons. The financial institutions making the ratings are very knowledgeable and have access to a great deal of information, the ratings take into account a wide variety of information, and the
ratings are updated on a timely basis as the firm's financial
condition changes.
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The National Solid Waste Management Association's Petition for
Rulemaking

The National Solid Wastes Management Association
("NSWMA"), in a rulemaking petition 51 filed with the Agency in
1990, prompted the EPA's review 52 of the Subtitle C financial test
and facilitated the development of a Subtitle D-specific mechanism. NSWMA noted that the Subtitle C test required an excessive margin of safety, and acted as an unnecessary constraint on
fiscally-sound firms.53 The Association proposed a new financial
test that would apply to both Subtitle C and D facilities. The petition also pointed out that certain modifications should be made
to the trust fund and letter of credit mechanisms in order to
make them truly cost-effective alternatives.
NSWMA commissioned the firm of Meridian Research, Inc. to
conduct a review of the Agency's financial assurance criteria and

Id. at 16-17.
51. Petition of the National Solid Wastes Management Association
to Initiate a Proceeding to Revise Financial Assurance Criteria and
Mechanisms, Feb. 16, 1990. *
52. For various discussions of the NSWMA petition and the recommendations contained therein, see, e.g., Standards Applicable to Owners
and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal
Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,201 (1991); Standards Applicable to Owners
and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal
Facilities, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,832 (1992); Financial Assurance Mechanisms
Corporate Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities and Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,523 (1994); Financial Assurance Mechanisms Corporate Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill
Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,706 (1998).
53. NSWMA argued that:
(1) the present financial assurance criteria, in practice, require far more financial assurance than is reasonably necessary; (2) deficiencies in the financial test and the failure of
the EPA to consider the time value of money promise to
render the corporate guarantee virtually unavailable to even
the strongest companies in the solid waste business; and (3)
the problems with the financial test, if uncorrected, will
cause many companies to rely more heavily on trust funds,
the least cost-effective financial assurance mechanism.
Id. at 4-5.
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mechanisms.5 4 One of the Association's concerns was that the
"proliferation of state financial assurance programs"5 5 justified an
EPA requirement that "state programs should not be allowed to
56
set assurance requirements that deviate from federal limits.
In response, on July 1, 1991, the EPA proposed a revised Subti57
tle C financial test that represented a significant improvement.
The regulated community's comments to the EPA on the
Agency's proposed revisions to the Subtitle C test voiced general
support for the Subtitle C revision proposal; in particular, the
commenters strongly supported the Agency's determination to
delete the currently utilized "six times" multiplier for net worth
and net working capital. The six times multiple requirement had
proven to be not only expensive but inefficient. It had forced financially secure firms to provide assurance for highly improbable

54. MERIDIAN RESEARCH, INC., FINAL REPORT, FINANCIAL ASSURANCE
FOR

MANAGEMENT FIRMS, (1989) [herinafter MERIDIAN RE(included as part of the record for the NSWMA petition).
55. NSWMA Petition, supra note 51, at 11; MERIDIAN REPORT, supra
WASTE

PORT]

note 54, at 5-3, 5-4.
56. NSWMA Petition, supra note 51, at 11. The Petition noted that:
The second major problem facing waste management companies, especially those with facilities in more than one state, is
the proliferation of state financial assurance programs. It is
estimated that there will soon programs under state and federal regulations. The growth be more than 100 different financial responsibility in state programs will significantly increase costs for waste management firms because states may
require demonstration of assurance dedicated exclusively to
facilities in their state and/or establish assurance levels or
mechanisms different from those required by other states
and by the federal programs. As a result, companies will be
required to provide overlapping financial assurance for
highly improbable combinations of events at great costs without compensating environmental benefit. Also, in some states
a firm may be able to use a financial test for a particular
level of assurance. In another state, the company may not be
able to use a financial test at all or may only be able to use it
to assure a lower level of obligations.

Id.
57. Standards Applicable to Owners and Operators of Hazardous

Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,201
(1991).
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levels of contingent costs. It had compelled excessive "internalization" of costs and needlessly restricted the ability of financially
secure firms to expand or to maintain existing waste management capacity.
Those commenters" disagreed, however, with the EPA's proposal to the extent that it would retain the requirement that the
owner or operator demonstrate that it has assets in the United
States that amount to at least 90% of total assets. They could discern no justification, either in theory or practice, for the inclusion of a restriction that inequitably and adversely affected multinational firms. The "domestic assets" provision took on additional importance given that, in light of several important (and
appropriate) proposed changes to the financial test, the provision would stand as perhaps the most prohibitive aspect of the
mechanism. The commenters argued that retention of the current domestic asset provision in a Part 258 financial test would
lead to a significant reduction in the average level of financial responsibility obligations that multi-national firms can self-assure.
The Agency was also urged to further consider the financial
test developed by NSWMA as an alternative to the EPA proposal.
The commenters emphasized the fact that the NSWMA test, unlike the EPA's recommended approach, contained neither a bias
against multi-national firms nor a prohibitive hurdle for small
firms. In response, the EPA stated that it was deferring a final
Subtitle C rule on the subject because it was "continuing to evaluate comments received on the proposed revisions to the financial tests . . . . 59
E.

The 1991 40 C.FR. Part 258 Subtitle D Regulations

In a final rule promulgated in October of 1991, the EPA issued
standards for municipal solid waste (i.e., household waste) disposal sites pursuant to Subtitle D of RCRA. 60 While the EPA established in the 1991 40 C.F.R. Part 258 rulemaking a number of

58. See, e.g., Comments of National Solid Waste Management Association; Comments of Browning-Ferris Industries.
59. Financial Responsibility Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,832 (1992).
60. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978
(1991) (amending 40 C.F.R. pt. 257 and establishing a new pt. 258).
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general financial assurance requirements, 61 the Agency determined that in light of the issues raised by the Keystone Project
Report and the NSWMA rulemaking petition, and its determination that it would not employ a "performance standard", it
would subsequently fashion Subtitle D-specific financial tests for
use by the public and private sectors. The Agency accordingly
"reserved" those subsections of Subpart G of Part 258.62
In response to arguments that the "necessity of financial assurance requirements for protecting human health and the environment from threats posed by MSWLFs" had not been demonstrated so as to justify the imposition of financial responsibility
requirements, the Agency emphasized that:
EPA believes it has ample authority to require financial assurance demonstrations under today's rule. Sections 1008(a) (3),
4004(a), and 4010 of RCRA, as amended by HSWA, direct the
Agency to develop criferia to protect against potential adverse
impacts to human health and the environment from solid waste
disposal activities. The Agency has determined that financial responsibility is a necessary component of the regulatory program
and is essential to protecting human health and the
environment.

61. The financial assurance requirements are codified in Subpart
G of Part 258, 40 C.F.R. § 258.70-.74 (1997).
62. The EPA set an effective date of April 9, 1994 for Subpart G,
40 C.F.R. § 258.70(b), with the understanding that while it "reserved"
the financial test mechanisms for the public and private sectors (§
258.74(e)-(h)), it "plan(ned) to propose part 258 requirements that include these requirements in 1992. The Agency anticipates that these
four requirements would take effect concurrently." 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978,
51,118 (1991). The EPA did not propose the local government and corporate financial test mechanisms until December 27, 1993 (local government test, see 58 Fed. Reg. 68,353 (1993)) and October 12, 1994 (see
59 Fed. Reg. 51,523 (1994)), and did not promulgate the local government test until November of 1996 (see 61 Fed. Reg. 60,328 (1996)).
While the EPA announced in late 1996 that it "expects to promulgate
the final corporate test in the spring of 1997," id. at 60,329, it postponed promulgation of the corporate financial test until April of 1998.
The EPA ultimately delayed the general financial assurance date until
April 9, 1997, except for remote, small landfills (those facilities had a
compliance deadline of October 9, 1997). See 60 Fed. Reg. 17,649
(1995).
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The Agency has long maintained that financial responsibility requirements are an important component of any regulatory
scheme, such as today's Part 258 criteria. In establishing the
regulatory framework for the management of municipal solid
waste, the Agency believes that inclusion of the financial responsibility requirements will promote the overall statutory and
regulatory goals of RCRA by encouraging the development and
implementation of sound solid waste management practices
both during and at the end of active facility operations. Specifically, the requirements will ensure that adequate funds are
available to cover the costs of closure, post-closure care, and
corrective action activities which, if not planned for, often are
left unfunded. Additional governmental expenditures would
then be necessary to ensure continued protection of human
63
health and the environment.
Significantly, the EPA determined that it agreed
with commenters that the performance standard, as proposed,
did not provide sufficient guidance to ensure that financial
mechanisms obtained in compliance with the rule would be adequate. This lack of specificity in the proposed performance
criteria could have resulted in significant inconsistencies among
State programs. The Agency, therefore, has adopted a modified
performance standard approach to financial assurance in the final rule. This approach consists of a revised set of financial
mechanisms that may be used to demonstrate financial assurance. The rule also specifies minimum provisions of each
mechanism that must be satisfied to be considered an acceptable mechanism, including minimum qualifications for providers of assurance. 64
While the 1991 regulation included several specific financial as-

63. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978,
51,104-05 (1991) (preamble to Part 258 regulations).
64. Id. at 51,114.
While the Agency continues to believe that a performance
standard-based approach is most appropriate to allow States
sufficient flexibility to select and tailor their financial assurance programs to allow as many options for compliance as
possible, the performance criteria should ensure that all allowable financial mechanisms will provide for adequate financial assurance. All of the mechanisms currently allowed
under subtitle C are authorized to be used to comply with
the financial assurance requirements [in Part 258].
Id. at 51,114-15.
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surance demonstration mechanisms (trust fund, 65 surety bond
guaranteeing payment or performance, 66 letter of credit,6v insurance, 68 state-approved mechanisms, 69 and state assumption of responsibility7 °), the Agency deferred issuance of a financial test/
corporate guarantee on the basis that it was "considering revising
the criteria of the corporate financial test currently available to
Subtitle C hazardous waste facilities,"7 1 and intended
to propose that this revised corporate test also be available to
owners or operators of MSWLFs, thus allowing financially
strong firms to demonstrate that setting aside funds in a trust
fund or obtaining third-party assurance of their closure, postclosure care and corrective action costs is unnecessary. The cost
of such a test should be minimal, amounting only to the cost of
72
making the required demonstrations.
The Agency also committed to "proposing a financial test developed specifically for local governments. The Agency anticipates
that the effective date of both these new tests will concur with
the effective date [then April 9, 1994] of today's financial responsibility requirements. '73 Moreover, the EPA made clear that it did
not believe that utilization of the then-applicable Subtitle C financial test would be a reasonably available mechanism for own74
ers/operators of municipal solid waste landfills.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See, 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(a) (1997).
See id. § 258.74(b).
See id. § 258.74(c).
See id. § 258.74(d).

69. See id. § 258.74(i).

70. See id. § 258.74(j).
71. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978,
51,105 (1991).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 51,115. The Agency stated that:
In addition to the instruments specified in the performance
standard, EPA is currently re-evaluating, and will consequently propose revisions to, the subtitle C corporate financial test as part of a separate rulemaking. The Agency would
anticipate proposing at the same time conforming changes
to the part 258 financial responsibility performance standard
to allow this revised corporate test to be used as a compliance option for demonstrating financial responsibility for
MSWLFs. These changes to the corporate financial test
would be proposed on a timeframe similar to the local gov-
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The EPA emphasized that:
Given the minimum requirements specified, the Agency believes that it is not necessary to limit allowable mechanisms, as
some commenters suggested, to cash, surety bonds or certificates of deposit. The Agency tailored these minimum qualifications to the particular characteristics and industry practices of
the providers of the financial mechanisms (e.g., sureties, banks,
insurers, etc.) in order to ensure the effectiveness of the mechanism as well as the stability of the provider. The Agency believes this approach is preferable to applying the same criteria
to all types of providers. In particular, the Agency believes that
it would be inappropriate to require all providers of financial
assurance mechanisms to satisfy the Subtitle C financial test,
which was designed to assess a private corporation's ability to
meet certain costs, not to evaluate the ability of a financial service's firm to carry out its business.7 5
The 1991 Subtitle D rules establish financial responsibility obligations for closure of the facility, post-closure care, and the necessary corrective action. They require that the municipal solid
waste landfill owner or operator must "have a detailed written estimate, in current dollars, of the cost of hiring a third party to
close the largest area of all MSWLF units requiring a final
cover . . . at any time during the active life [of the facility] in

accordance with the closure plan. 7 16 The cost estimate must
"equal the cost of closing the largest area of all MSWLF units
ever requiring a final cover at any time during the active life
when the extent and manner of operation would make closure
the most expensive, as indicated by its closure plan."7 7 Then, the*
owner or operator must establish "continuous coverage for closure until released from financial assurance requirements"" using one of the methods specified in § 258.74 until released upon
a demonstration of compliance with § 258.60 (h) and (i). "During the active life of the MSWLF unit, the owner or operator
79
must annually adjust the closure cost estimate for inflation."

ernment financial test.
Id. at 51,115.
75. Id.
76. 40 C.F.R. § 258.71(a) (1997).
77. Id. § 258.71(a)(1).
78. Id. § 258.71(b).
79. Id. § 258.71(a) (2).
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The owner or operator is further required to "increase the closure cost estimate and the amount of financial assurance provided . . . if changes in the closure plan or MSWLF unit conditions increase the maximum cost of closure at any time during
the remaining active life. '' 8° Alternatively, the closure cost estimate and the amount of financial responsibility provided may be
reduced "if the cost estimate exceeds the maximum cost of closure at any time during the remaining life of the MSWLF unit."'"
The owner or operator is also required to notify the State Director that the detailed closure cost estimate, as required by §
258.71(a), and "the justification for the reduction of the closure
cost estimate and the amount of financial assurance has been
'82
placed in the operating record.
The EPA rules provide similar requirements for the demonstration of financial assurance for post-closure obligations.8 3 The
owner or operator must prepare "a detailed written estimate, in
current dollars, of the cost of hiring a third party to conduct
post-closure care for the MSWLF unit in compliance with the
post-closure plan. ''8 4 The costs must account for "the total costs
of conducting post-closure care, including annual and periodic
costs as described in the post-closure plan over the entire postclosure care period."8 5 The cost estimate must "be based on the
most expensive costs of post-closure care during the post-closure
care period. '' 86 Owners/operators must then establish continuous
financial assurance for post-closure care using one of the methods specified in § 258.74 until released through the demonstration of compliance with § 258.61 (e). 87 The cost estimate and
corresponding financial assurance must be adjusted yearly during
the active site life8 8 as well as during the post-closure care period
for both inflation and for any changes in either the landfill conditions or the post-closure plan that would increase the maximum cost.8 9

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
See
See

§ 258.71(a) (3).
§ 258.71(a)(4).
id. § 258.72.
§ 258.72(a).
§ 258.72(a)(1).
id. § 258.72(b).
id. § 258.72(a)(2).
id. § 258.72(a)(3).
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The owner may reduce the post-closure care estimate and the
amount of financial responsibility if the cost estimate exceeds the
maximum cost at any time during the remaining financial responsibility period. 90 The owner must notify the State Director
that the justification and amount of financial responsibility has
been placed in the operating record. 9' In addition, owners/operfor corrective action
ators must provide financial responsibility
92
(for known releases only) until released.
Ten different mechanisms for the demonstration of financial
responsibility are authorized by the Subtitle D rules. Owners/operators of facilities may select any mechanism, or mix of mechanisms, to demonstrate financial responsibility. The mechanisms
endorsed by the EPA are the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

93

Trust fund
94
Surety bond
95
Letter of Credit
96
Insurance
97
Corporate Financial Test (issued April, 1998)
Local Government Financial Test (issued November, 1996)98
Corporate Guarantee (issued April, 1998) 99
Local Government Guarantee'0 0
01 2
State Approved' 0 ' Mechanism

90. See id. § 258.72(a) (4).
91. See id.
92. See id. § 258.72(b).
93. See id. § 258.74(a).
94. See id. § 258.74(b).
95. See id. § 258.74(c).
96. See id. § 258.74(d).
97. See id. § 258.74(e).
98. See id. § 258.74(f).
99. See id. § 2 58 .7 4 (g).
100. See id. § 258.74(h).
101. The EPA stated that:
Any State-approved mechanism must meet the performance
criteria specified may choose to approve individual mechanisms submitted by owners or operators on a case-by-case basis. In either case, a State should develop a process for approval to ensure that mechanisms meet the performance
standard. In addition, States may wish to specify mechanism
language and include provisions regarding qualification of
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10. State Assumption of Financial Responsibility 1°3
A number of states (particularly those that lacked financial assurance programs or whose programs were not as stringent as
the Part 258 criteria) adopted-generally, by reference-the Part
258 financial assurance program. That meant that the financial
test/corporate guarantee and the local government financial
test/guarantee were "reserved" for future rulemakings as set
forth in the 1991 version of the EPA Part 258 regulations.
II.

THE PART

258 LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL TEST/
GUARANTEE

In late 1996, the EPA promulgated a financial test and guarantee for use by qualified local government' °4 owners and operators

providers and limiting cancellation. .

.

. The Agency expects

a mix of instruments provided by third parties and State-

approved mechanisms to be developed under this section.
States may wish to take into account a variety of factors, such
as the financial capability of lower owners and operators,
when developing new mechanisms. Depending on the State's
financial resources and on the population of owners and operators, a State may wish to institute and subsidize a loan or
grant program to assure that closure, post-closure care, and

corrective action obligations will be met. Other mechanisms
might include certificates of deposit, escrow accounts, enterprise funds, and enforced local government planning requirements. As a further example, the establishment of a financial assurance fund organized by the State and paid for
by participating MSWLFs may prove to be an attractive alternative in many states.
Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 51,105
(1991).
102. See 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(i) (1997).

103. See id. § 258.740):
If the State Director either assumes legal responsibility for an
owner or operator's compliance with the closure, post-

closure care and/or corrective action requirements of this
part, or assures that the funds will be available from State
sources to cover the requirements, the owner or operator
will be in compliance with the requirements of this section.
Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,032.
104. The preamble to the 1991 Subtitle D regulations notes that
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"(1)ocal governments include both general purpose local governments
(e.g., municipalities, counties, cities, townships, towns, and villages) and
special purpose local governments. Special purpose local governments,
generally designated as either public authorities or special districts, may
perform a single function or a limited range of functions." Solid Waste
Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,106. Municipal solid waste
landfills owned or operated by State or federal entities "whose debts
and liabilities are the debts and liabilities of a State or the United
States" are not subject to the Part 258 financial responsibility requirement. 40 C.F.R. § 258.70(a). The EPA refused, however, to exclude municipalities, counties and other political subdivisions of states from the
financial responsibility program. The Agency agreed with commenters
who supported its proposal to require local governments to demonstrate financial assurance:
Commenters supporting the Agency's proposal argued that
local governments may be unable to raise the necessary
funds through their taxing powers and that local governments may not be able to make long-term advance commitments of future funds necessary to provide adequate assurance. Commenters argued further that because of these
limitations on the availability of funds, all owners and operators, including local governments, need to factor the cost of
closure and post-closure care into the management of an
MSWLF in order to ensure that the site is not abandoned.
Several commenters suggested that many MSWLFs operated
by local governments could become future Superfund sites if
financial assurance is not required of local governments.
Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,106. The
Agency agreed
with commenters who asserted that local governments may
be unable to raise sufficient funds through taxation and that
local governments may not be able to make long-term commitments of future funds. While several commenters contended that local governments would have the ability to raise
funds in a timely manner sufficient to cover the costs of closure, post-closure care and corrective action, these commenters did not supply the Agency with evidence that this
was generally true for all local governments. While the
Agency recognizes that many local governments, like Federal
and State governments, are permanent entities that act to se-

cure the well-being of their citizens, there is substantial variation among local governments in terms of size, financial capacity, and functions performed. It is therefore likely that
there is substantial variation among these governments in
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of municipal solid waste landfills. The local government financial
test consists of a) a bond rating requirement, 0 5 b) alternative liquidity and debt service ratios that may be satisfied if the local
government does not possess any outstanding general obligation

terms of their ability to meet their closure, post-closure care
and corrective action obligations in a timely manner. Exempting all local governments from the requirements would
provide insufficient protection of human health and the environment. Furthermore, although local governments are unlikely to abandon their MSWLFs even in the event of bankruptcy, studies of the probability of bankruptcy among local
governments indicate that (relative to Federal and State governments) they are generally (1) more limited in terms of financial resources and less flexible in their annual budgets,
thereby making reallocation of a substantial amount of funds
for a specific purpose in a given year more difficult; (2) less
able to obtain their traditional sources of financing (e.g.,
bond issues, taxes, and intergovernmental transfers) quickly
enough to ensure funding in a timely manner; and (3) more
prone to fiscal emergencies than Federal and State governments. Also, while localities in bankruptcy may be able to
meet their obligations over the long term, obligations such
as closure and corrective action may require immediate financing to ensure adequate protection of human health and
the environment. In light of the need to ensure that all owners and operators meet their environmental obligations in a
timely manner, combined with the variability among municipalities, the Agency believes that a uniform set of applicable
requirements is necessary. Therefore, the Agency has decided against allowing States to decide whether to exempt
their own local governments.
Id. at 51,107. Moreover,
(w)hile the Agency recognizes that local governments may
vary in their ability to meet the costs of closure, post-closure
care, and corrective action, the Agency is unable to support
a variance for any type of local government (e.g., cities,
counties). The same concerns that prompted the Agency to
include local governments generally apply to these special
categories as well. Requiring all local governments to demonstrate financial assurance should encourage appropriate advanced planning for the costs of closure, post-closure care,
and corrective action for known releases by these entities.

Id.
105. 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(f) (1) (i) (A).
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bonds, or only has unrated general obligation bonds, 10 6 c) use of
financial statements prepared in conformance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") when the financial ratios
alternative is selected, 0 7 and d) a disqualification in the event
that 1) the local government is currently in default on any outstanding general obligation bond, 0 8 2) has any outstanding general obligation bonds rated lower than Baa by Moody's or BBB
by Standard and Poor's, 10 9 3) has operated at a deficit equal to
five percent or more of total annual revenue in each of the past
two fiscal years, 10 or 4) has received an adverse opinion, disclaimer of opinion, or other qualified opinion from an independent certified public accounting (or appropriate State agency)
auditing its financial statement."'
The final rule also requires a local government that uses the financial test to:
disclose in its annual budget or financial report the estimated
costs of its closure, post-closure and corrective action obligations, including the years when such costs are expected to be
incurred. Closure, post-closure, and corrective action costs that
are to be incurred during a local government's current budget
period must be included as line items in that budget; those
costs that are to be incurred in future budget periods need
only be disclosed in a supplemental section to a local government's budget or financial report."'

106. Id. § 258.74(f)(1)(i) (B).
107. Id. § 258.74(f) (1)(ii).
108. Id. § 258.74(f) (1)(iii) (A).
109. Id. § 258.74(f) (1)(iii) (B).
110. Id. § 258.74(f)(1)(iii) (C).
111. Id. § 258.74(f)(1)(iii)(D).
112. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,328, 60,329 (1996); 40 C.F.R. §
258.74(f) (2):
Disclosure must include the nature and source of closure
and post-closure care requirements, the reported liability at
the balance sheet date, the estimated total closure and postclosure care cost remaining to be recognized, the percentage
of landfill capacity used to date, and the estimated landfill
life in years. A reference to corrective action costs must be
placed in the CAFR [comprehensive annual financial report]
not later than 120 days after the corrective action remedy
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The facility operating record must include the following:
(1) A letter from the local government's chief financial officer
stating that the local government satisfies the requirements of
the financial test for those costs for which financial assurance is
being demonstrated through the financial test"3 ;
(2) The local government's independently audited year-end financial statement prepared in accordance with GAAP" 4;
(3) The opinion prepared by the auditor of the local government's year-end financial statement"5 ; and
(4) An evaluation by the local government's auditor or by the
appropriate state agency that the information in the chief financial officer's letter to the operating record is consistent with the
116
local government's year-end financial statement.
The rule also requires that local governments that use the test
review their financial condition each year in order to determine
whether the requirements of the test are satisfied. A local government which concludes that it no longer qualifies for use of
the test must obtain alternative financial assurance within 210
117
days of the close of the fiscal year.

has been selected in accordance with the requirements of §
258.58. For the first year the financial test is used to assure
costs at a particular facility, the reference may instead be
placed in the operating record until issuance of the next
available CAFR if timing does not permit the reference to be
incorporated into the most recently issued CAFR or budget.
Id.
113. 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(f) (3) (i) (A) (1).
114. Id. §258.74(f) (3) (i) (B).
115. Id. §258.74(f) (3) (i) (C).
116. Id. § 258.74(f)(3)(i)(B).
117. See 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(f) (3) (v). In addition,
(t)he Director of an approved State, based on a reasonable
belief that the local government owner or operator may no
longer meet the requirements of the local government financial test, may require additional reports of financial condition from the local government at any time. If the Director
of an approved State finds, on the basis of such reports or
other information, that the owner or operator no longer
meets the requirements of the local government financial
test, the local government must provide alternate financial
assurance in accordance with this section.
Id. § 258.74(f) (3)(vi).
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Perhaps the most important qualification of the financial test
is the provision that limits the amount of closure, post-closure,
and corrective action costs for which a local government may
demonstrate financial responsibility through the financial test. "A
local government may only use the financial test to demonstrate
financial assurance for the costs of its total environmental obligations up to a maximum amount that does not exceed 43 percent
of the local government's total annual revenues ..
"..
118 If the
local government does not assure other federally-established environmental obligations for which financial assurance is required
through a financial test, it may assure closure, post-closure, and
corrective action costs that equal up to 43 percent of the local
government's total annual revenue. 19
If, however, the local government assures other environmental
obligations through a financial test, including those associated
with underground injection control facilities, 20 petroleum underground storage tank facilities,' 2' PCB storage facilities, 12 2 or
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities 123 it
must add those costs to the closure, post-closure, and corrective
action costs it seeks to assure [under the financial test]. The total that may be assured must not exceed 43 percent of the local
government's total annual revenue. 24
The EPA determined that a 43 percent limit was appropriate
based on an examination of "the public financial literature"'' 25 regarding the "percent of total revenues [that] . . .a local govern-

ment could devote annually to meet environmental obligations
over a typical bonding period"'' 26 and not experience undue fi-

118. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 60,328, 60,329 (1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 278.74(f) (4)).
119. See 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(f) (4) (i).
120. See id. § 144.62.
121. See id. pt. 280.
122. See id. pt. 761.
123. See id. pts. 264-65.
124. See id. § 278.74(f) (4) (ii).

125. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 58 Fed.
Reg. 68,353, 68,359 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 258).
126. Id. The preamble to the proposed regulation sheds light on
the EPA's methodology:
First, the Agency assumed that the local government would
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nancial difficulty. In rejecting the argument that a 43 percent
threshold should apply with regard to all environmental obligations and not simply those the local government is self-assuring,
the Agency stated that:
The 43 percent threshold limit on a local government's ability.
to "self-insure" its environmental obligations ensures that a local government's environmental obligations, for which a local
government proposes to demonstrate financial assurance on the
basis of its financial ability, are not disproportionate to its relative financial capability to fulfill those obligations. EPA has determined that a local government may reasonably be expected
to be able to pay the costs of its environmental obligations that
it is "self-assuring" at any one time up to 43 percent of its total
annual revenues. To the extent that the anticipated costs of a
local government's environmental obligations that are being deferred at any one time were to exceed 43 percent of its total
annual revenues, EPA believes that it would be substantially less
likely that a local government would be financially able to, in
fact, fulfill those obligations at the time that they were to become due. Since EPA believes that a community may safely
"self-insure" its environmental obligations up to 43 percent of
its total annual revenues, it is not necessary to disqualify a community from using the financial test if its total environmental financial assurance costs are greater than 43 percent of its total
annual revenues. In such a case, a community should be able
to realize the same cost savings as other communities by selfinsuring at least a portion of its environmental obligations and
obtaining third-party financial assurance instruments for any
costs that exceed the 43 percent threshold.'27

spread the costs over 20 years. Using the same calculations
that a bank would use to calculate the monthly payments on
a homebuyer's mortgage, the Agency calculated the annual
payment a local government would have to make on a 20year loan at a 10 percent rate of interest to meet its assured
costs. The Agency then assumed that those annual payments
should be equal to a maximum of 5 percent of total annual
revenue. Based on these assumptions, a local government
could borrow an amount equal [or] up to 43 percent of its
total annual revenue, without unreasonable financial stress.

Id.
127. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 60,328, 60,334 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 258).
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The final rule also included a "guarantee" provision whereby a
local government could guarantee the costs of closure, postclosure care and corrective action associated with a municipal
solid waste landfill owned by another government or by a private
party. 128 The local government guarantor is required to assume
responsibility for the obligations of the facility owner or operator
if the owner or operator fails to do so-by either performing the
activity itself,129 utilizing a third-party to do so,' 30 or establishing a
fully funded trust fund,' and provide proof that it passes the financial test requirements. 3 2 However, "[e]ven if a local government guarantee is not precluded by state law, a state may nevertheless disallow the use of the guarantee if it determines that
there is the potential for abuse."' 3 3 If the guarantee is subsequently canceled, or the guarantor no longer meets the requirements of the financial test, the owner or operator of the landfill
must obtain alternative financial assurance within 90. days after
notice of cancellation 134 or "the determination that the guarantor
no longer meets the requirements.' 1 35 "If the owner or operator
fails to provide alternate financial assurance within the 90-day pe36
riod, the guarantor must provide that alternate assurance"'
within 120 days of the notice of cancellation 37 or determination1 38 that the guarantor no longer meets the requirements.
The EPA intended that the financial test be available and costeffective. It estimated that fully "91 percent of all local governments that own or operate a MSWLF would be able to use the
test for at least some amount of their subtitle D obligations,
while 54 percent of all local governments would be able to use
39
the financial test for at least all of their subtitle D obligations."

128. See 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(h).
129. See id.§ 258.74(h)(1)(i) (A).
130. See id.
131. See id.§ 258.74(h)(1)(i) (B).

132. Id.§ 258.74(h).
133. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 60,328, 60,334 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 258).
134. 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(h) (1) (iii).
135. Id. § 258.74(h) (2) (iii).
136. Id. § 258.74(h)(1)(iii).
137. See id.
§ 258.74(h)(1)(iii).
138. See id. § 258.74(h) (2)(ii).
139. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Own-
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Those few communities that lack general obligation bonds or
whose bonds are unrated and accordingly cannot utilize the
bond rating requirement are nonetheless allowed to qualify for
the financial test by satisfying one of the financial assurance ratios. 140 The EPA expected that the vast majority of local govern-

ments would be able to qualify for use of the financial test solely
on the basis of having an investment grade bond rating on all
outstanding general obligation bonds. The Agency rejected the
arguments of some commenters that "general obligation bond
ratings are not good indicators of the financial health of the local government that issues the bonds, because the ratings indicate the risk associated with the bonds themselves rather than
any risk associated with the financial capability of the issuing local government." 141
In addition, the Agency defended the selection of alternative
liquidity142 and debt service 143 ratios 144 by declaring that fully "96

ers and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 60,328, 60,330 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.ER. pt. 258).
140. See id. at 60,331.
141. Id.
142. See 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(f) (1) (i) (B) (1).
143. Id. § 258.74(f) (1) (i) (B) (2). The regulation requires that the
owner or operator, on the basis of the most recent audited annual financial statement, satisfy a ratio of cash plus marketable securities to
total expenditures greater than or equal to 0.05. The EPA concluded
that a liquidity ratio, though derived from a local government's balance
sheet and subject to being "manipulated to reach a particular result,"
Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and
Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at
60,332, does "provide a measure of a local government's ability to meet
current and expected obligations." Id. It concluded that a requirement
that the local government maintain more than a five percent cash balance was unnecessary because it was not reasonable to assume that the
entity be required to "respond to all of its potential MSWLF closure,
post-closure care and corrective action obligations at any one time." Id.
The purpose of the ratio requirement is, instead, to ensure that the
government has "the financial flexibility to be able to respond to some
unexpected obligations in addition to fulfilling its planned or anticipated obligations." Id.
144. The EPA responded to concerns that a proposed "borrowed
funds ratio" (Proposed § 258.74(f) (1) (i) (B) (2)) would not have been
satisfied by many communities, id., and did not include the ratio in the
final regulation. See Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Govern-
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percent of all local governments that own or operate MSWLFs
maintain . . . a minimum cash balance and would satisfy the li-

quidity ratio"' 45 and by suggesting that all but the most impecu46
nious local governments would meet the debt service ratio.
States moved promptly to incorporate the local government financial test/guarantee into their regulations. Indeed, in several
instances (most notably North Carolina and Ohio), state environmental agencies proposed the adoption of the proposed version of
the federal regulation. The promulgation of the standards by the
EPA and their prompt inclusion into state implementing regulations made even more clear the need for a similar cost-effective
yet protective criterion for private owners/operators.
A.

The Part 258 Financial Test/Corporate Guarantee

The EPA's recently promulgated financial test/corporate guarantee is an important step forward that should be incorporated
into state regulations and made available to qualified, financially
sound private owners/operators of municipal solid waste landfills. The mechanisms will provide protective, yet economical
tools for the demonstration of financial responsibility. In estab-

ment Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,332.
145. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 60,332.
EPA also does not expect that local governments, which must
maintain a balanced budget under state law, would have to
specifically budget a five percent cash balance in order to
satisfy the liquidity ratio ....

EPA's research shows that the

vast majority of local governments already maintain enough
of their assets in cash and in current investments to pass the
liquidity ratio.
Id.
146. In the preamble to the proposed regulation, the EPA noted
that its analyses concluded that "of all local governments that own or
operate MSWLFs, 89.4 percent passed the debt service ratio, 96.5 percent passed the liquidity ratio, and 91.4 percent passed the use of borrowed funds ratio. The Agency estimates that 80 percent of all local
governments pass all three ratios." Financial Assurance Mechanisms for
Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste
Landfill Facilities, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,353, 68,357 (1993).
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lishing the regulatory standards, the EPA "endeavored to reasonably minimize the requirements associated with the mechanisms
and thereby promote private cost savings while at the same time
limiting the public costs."'' 4 The new Part 258 amendments set
forth a financial test and corporate guarantee for use by qualifying private landfill owners/operators. The criteria listed in the
new standards are consistent with those established in the Part
258 local government financial test/guarantee. The corporate financial test consists of: (a) a minimum size requirement; (b) a
bond rating/financial ratio provision; and (c) a domestic assets
148
requirement.
B.

CorporateFinancial Test

1. Minimum Size Requirement
The EPA standard requires firms using the financial test to
possess a tangible net worth at least equal to the sum of the costs
49
they seek to ensure through a financial test, plus $10 million.
The firm would also need to assure the minimum sum of clo50
sure, post-closure care, and known corrective action costs.
In addition, owners/operators are required to include cost estimates for obligations required under other regulatory programs, namely the injection well, underground storage tank, and
hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal (Subtitle C) programs.' 51 The Agency believes that these criteria will act as "an
initial screen for corporations in demonstrating financial respon-

147. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and
Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg.
17,706, 17,715 (1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 258).
148. See Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,729 (1998)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e)).
149. Obviously, "a firm with more landfills and a correspondingly
higher level of assets will also have a higher level of net worth than the
$10 million minimum." Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate
Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63
Fed. Reg. at 17,716.
150. See Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,729 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (1) (ii)).
151. See Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,729 (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (1) (iii)).
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sibility for the very large costs of closure, post-closure care, and
corrective action."

52

2.

Bond Rating/Financial Ratio Alternatives
In addition to meeting the minimum size requirement'53 and
the domestic asset test, 54 the EPA standard authorizes corporations to satisfy the remaining test requirements in one of two
ways:
a) Investment Grade Bond Ratings' 5 -a most recent rating of
senior unsecured bonds "of AAA, AA, A or BBB as issued by
Standard and Poor's or Aaa, Aa, A, or Baa as issued by
Moody's;"' 156 or

152. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and
Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. at
17,708 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 258).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
154. See infra text accompanying note 160.
155. The Agency has long recognized that bond ratings are a
"good demonstration of financial strength because [they] reflect[] the
expert opinion of the bond rating service and the financial community," and have been a "reasonably good indicator for predicting default." Standards Applicable to Owners and Operators of Hazardous
Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities; Financial Responsibility, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,201, 30,204 (1991). For example, EPA data showed
that none of the private firms which became bankrupt between 1966
and 1979 had an investment grade rated bond issuance. Id. Bond ratings "reflect the expert opinion of bond rating services, which are organizations that have established credibility in the financial community
for their predictions." Id. at 30,212. "While not infallible, bond ratings
are excellent predictors of whether bonds will be repaid with more
highly rated bonds having lower default rates than bonds with lower
ratings." Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and
Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. at
17,721; "[B]ond ratings have been excellent predictors of bankruptcy
."

Id. at 17,722.

156. Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,729 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e)(1)(i) (A)). The EPA rejected the use of
collateralized bonds, which are permitted by the local government financial test, on the basis that:
a collateralized bond can receive a rating that is not indicative of the overall strength of the firm that issues it, but
rather of the collateral backing it. In fact, a firm under fi-
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b) Ratio Alternative-either a leveraged ratio of 1.5 based on
the ratio of total liabilities to tangible net worth, 57 or a profitability ratio of greater than 0.10 based on the ratio of the sum of
net income plus depreciation, depletion and amortization, minus
the $10 million, to total liabilities.1 5 The ratios were selected because they were deemed to be "particularly good discriminators
59

of financial health."1

3.

Domestic Assets Requirement

Finally, the EPA standard requires that all firms using the financial test have assets in the United States that are at least
60
equal to the costs they seek to assure through a financial test.

nancial distress may only be successful in issuing a bond if it
pledges assets to back it.
Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and Operators
of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,709.
The EPA has emphasized that revisions in ratings (upward or
downward) are of no consequence as long as the rating on the senior
unsecured bond is investment grade. Accordingly, "most of these
changes will be within a ratings category (e.g., A to A-) or from one investment grade rating to another (BBB to A) and [will] be inconsequential for purposes of the financial test." Id. at 17,721.
157. Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,729 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (1) (i) (B)).
158. See id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e)(1)(i) (C)).
159. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and
Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. at
17,709.
160. Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,729 (codified at 40
C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (1) (iii)). The EPA rejected the notion that the Part
258 financial test should incorporate the six-times multiple which the
EPA proposed to delete from the Subtitle C financial test in 1994 (Financial Assurance Mechanisms Corporate Owners and Operators of
Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities and Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,523, 51,527
(1994)). Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and
Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. at
17,723. It stressed that a six times multiplier requirement would "have
the effect of potentially reducing the availability of the financial test,
and thereby increasing private costs, without a demonstration of how
[such a requirement] would make the test less available to firms which
would enter bankruptcy, and thereby decrease the public costs." Id.
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4.
Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements
The Agency regulation provides that the following three items
be placed in the facility operating record (either before the receipt of waste, or on the effective date of the rule and within 120
days following the selection of a corrective remedy).161
5. Chief Financial Officer Letter
The Chief Financial Officer of the firm is required to submit a
letter demonstrating compliance with the financial test. 162 The
Agency expects that the letter will include a worksheet that explains how the firm's financial data satisfies the regulatory
requirements. 163
6. Independent Certified Public Accountant's Opinion
An opinion from an independent certified public accountant
regarding the firm's financial statements for the latest completed
fiscal year must be placed in the facility operating record. 164 Unless the opinion is unqualified, the firm cannot utilize the financial test.' 65 The rule does, however, provide that in states with approved Part 258 programs the State Director may, on a case-by66
case basis, accept "qualified" opinions.1

The effect of a more stringent domestic asset requirement
would have limited the amount of obligations that a firm
qualifying for the financial test can cover. This would potentially have increased the private cost of the test, but not have
made the test a better predictor of bankruptcy. Only in the
unlikely event of a bankruptcy would this more stringent requirement have had an impact by having reduced the
amount of costs covered.
Id.
161. See Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,729 (codified at
40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (2)).
162. See id. (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (2) (i)).
163. See id. (codified at 40 C.F.R.§ 258.74(e) (2) (i)-(iii)).
164. See id. (codified at 40 C.F.R.§ 258.74(e) (2) (i) (B)).
165. See id.
166. See id.
Generally, an adverse opinion, disclaimer of opinion, or any
qualification in the opinion would automatically disqualify
the owner or operator from using the corporate financial

U.S. EPA 40 C.ER. PART 258
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Special Report from the Independent Certified Public
Accountant

The CPA is required to submit a special report confirming that
the data in the CFO's letter were appropriately derived from the
audited, year-end financial statements. 167 The report is not required when the firm utilizes financial test data obtained directly
from the annual financial statement provided to the Securities
1 68
and Exchange Commission.
8.

Annual Updates and Placement of Financial Test
Documentation

Each of the above-referenced items of documentation are,
under the federal regulation, subject to annual updating. 69 Documents would have to be placed into the facility operating record within ninety (90) days of the close of the firm's fiscal

test. The one potential exception is that the State Director of
an approved State may evaluate qualified opinions on a caseby-case basis, and accept such opinions if the matters which
form the basis for the qualified opinion are insufficient to
warrant disallowance of the test.
Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and Operators
of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,706, 17,710
(1998)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 258).
167. See Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,729-30 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (2) (i) (C)).
168. See id. A separate CPA statement is not required where the
CFO simply takes figures directly from an audited financial statement.
This is a straight forward process. On the other hand, where the CFO
"derives" the figures-for example, by using different accounting procedures to determine . . . liabilities-the process may require a high
level of financial expertise. In these cases, EPA believes review by an independent auditor is appropriate. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for
Corporate Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,710.
Likewise, the special report is required "if the CFO letter uses data
that are derived from and are not identical to the data in the audited
annual financial statements or other audited financial statements filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)." Id.
169. See Corporate Financial Test, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,729-30, (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (2) (iii)).
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year. 170
9.

Demonstrating Compliance With an Alternative Financial
Assurance Mechanism

The rule provides that if a firm no longer meets the requirements of the financial test, the owner/operator of the facility
must notify the State Director and obtain alternative financial assurance within 120 days of the close of the firm's fiscal year.' 7'
10.

Current Financial Test Documentation

Similarly, the Director of an approved state may, based on a
reasonable belief that the owner or operator no longer meets
the requirements of the financial test, require the owner/operator to provide current documentation demonstrating
17 2
compliance.
11.

Corporate Guarantee

The EPA regulation permits three types of qualified
guarantors:
(1) The parent corporation or principal shareholder of the
73
owner/operator;1
(2) "[A] firm whose parent corporation is also the parent corporation of the owner or operator," 17 4 (a corporate sibling); and
(3) Other related or non-related firms "with a 'substantial business relationship' with the owner or operator" (including subsidiaries of the owner or operator).175
Guarantors must meet the conditions of the financial test or
any financial instrument authorized by the Part 258 financial as-

170. See id.
171. See id. (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (2) (v)).
172. See id. (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.74(e) (2) (vi)).
173. See id. (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2 58 .74 (g)(1)).
174. Id.
175. See id. "If the guarantor is a firm with a 'substantial business
relationship' with the owner or operator, [the proposed guarantor]
must describe this 'substantial business relationship' and the value received in consideration of the guarantee." Id.

1998]

U.S. EPA 40 C.FR. PART 258

surance regulations. 7 6 In cases where the guarantor is not a corporate parent, grandparent, or sibling, the letter from the CFO
would have to explain how a "substantial business relationship"
exists.' 77 A guarantor may cancel a guarantee, but the cancellation could not become effective until 120 days after receipt of
such notice by both the State Director and the owner/operator.17 8 In addition, a guarantor that seeks to cancel the guarantee
must provide an alternative method of financial assurance if the
owner/operator cannot provide such alternative mechanism
within 90 days following receipt of the notice of cancellation. 7 9
Only one state commented in opposition8 ° to the proposed financial test/corporate guarantee. 8 ' The EPA, while noting that
RCRA authorizes state agencies to establish requirements more
stringent than the federal mandates, believes that the final Part
8 2
258 financial test/corporate guarantee regulations are sound
176. See id. § 25 8 .74 (g) (3) (i).
177. See id. § 25 8 .74 (g)(1).
178. See id. § 258.7 4 (g) (3) (ii).
179. See id. § 258.74(g) (3) (iii).
180. Several surety and insurance companies, along with the Solid
Waste Association of North America, also commented in opposition to
part or all of the proposed regulations. See Insurers Split with Waste Companies over EPA Proposal on Financial Tests, SOLID WASTE REPORT, Jan. 22,
1998, at 27.
181. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Corporate Owners and
Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,706,
17,725 (1998). The state claimed that "a financial test does not provide
a State or (the) EPA access to funds to complete closure, post-closure,
or corrective action should the financially responsible corporation refuse to take the needed action." Id. The EPA responded that "this circumstance does not distinguish itself from others where EPA or a State
must undertake enforcement to obtain compliance. The likelihood of a
financially sound firm nevertheless being reluctant to fulfill its obligations is not affected by today's final rule." Id. at 17,725-26.
182. See id. at 17,714. The EPA stated:
[I]t encourages States to adopt the additional flexibility for
financial assurance mechanisms reflected in these final rules.
EPA believes that these mechanisms will result in significant
cost savings for owners and operators subject to financial assurance requirements. At the same time, EPA believes the financial assurance mechanisms adopted today effectively delineate eligible owners and operators who have a low
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and that private firms will save at least $65.8 million annually
through use of the mechanisms. 8 3 Likewise, the Agency expects
that local governments will save approximately $138 million annually 84 through the use of the Part 258 financial test.
III.

THE ABSENCE OF A CORPORATE FINANCIAL TEST/CORPORATE

GUARANTEE MECHANISM AS OPTIONS FOR THE DEMONSTRATION OF
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY WOULD RESULT IN AN UNFAIR AND

BURDENSOME SYSTEM

The need for the incorporation into state regulations of the
cost-effective, yet protective, mechanisms developed by the EPA
for the demonstration of financial responsibility by private owners/operators of municipal solid waste landfills is clear and uncontroverted. Indeed, two conclusions can be drawn from the
U.S. EPA's efforts to revise the current RCRA Subtitle C test and
from the history of financial responsibility programs. First, it is
essential that states utilize a financial/self-assurance test as an option available to all owners/operators. Second, the financial test
must be an accurate and reliable indicator of financial strength
and long-term viability. The final report of the Keystone Center
Financial Responsibility Project, drawing upon the consensus of
government, public, and public and private waste industry members, stressed that:
[t]he financial test provides certain significant advantages over
the other mechanisms. First, the financial test is the most cost
effective financial responsibility mechanism. It eliminates the
need for a third party financial mechanism and the resultant
tangible costs of transaction charges (premium for insurance
policies, fees for letters of credit, etc.) as well as the intangible
opportunity cost of funds (cash or collateral is tied up in a
trust fund or letter of credit).

probability of business failure from owners and operators
that are unable to meet their obligations. By restricting the
financial test and guarantee to viable firms, the mechanisms
in today's rule avoid undue public costs.
Id.
183. See id. at 17,727.
184. Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facilities, 58 Fed.
Reg. 68,353, 68,363 (1993).
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Second, the financial test provides an option to the other financial mechanisms. This is particularly important because market

constraints may have an adverse effect upon the availability of
185
the other instruments (e.g., insurance).
Likewise, the EPA has also stressed the need for a financial test/
self-assurance mechanism and pointed out that the failure to include such a mechanism would result in a "burdensome"
86
program. 1
The EPA standards assure that the general public will not be
responsible for the costs of facility closure, post-closure monitoring, and corrective action. The new mechanisms are excellent
predictors of a private firm's fiscal health-they are reflective
both of a firm's current financial condition and as an accurate
and reliable indicator of long-term viability. A number of states
have indicated that they will incorporate the EPA mechanism
into their regulations, yet several jurisdictions (among them Florida, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, California, and Ohio) either do not authorize the use of any "self-assurance" mechanism
(such as a financial test) or, to date, insist upon utilization of the
more stringent, less available Subtitle C test (indeed, the Subtitle
C based test is incorporated in part from the 1980 EPA RCRA
regulations and does not reflect the improvements made to that
mechanism as a result of the NSWMA Petition and the EPA's
subsequent rulemakings).
It is clear that overly stringent financial responsibility requirements can have profoundly adverse consequences. Inflexible or
unavailable financial responsibility mechanisms could conceivably
either prompt firms to abandon facilities before closing them or
may unnecessarily restrict the availability of needed waste management capacity. Likewise, firms that cannot utilize a financial/
self-assurance test to satisfy their financial responsibility obligations because of their size or the nature of the their operations
often cannot build new environmentally protective state-of-the-art
facilities.
Moreover, unnecessarily restrictive financial responsibility rules
may also either discourage private-firm ownership of waste management facilities or encourage the use of financial assurance

185. KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 36, at 9.
186. See, e.g., Standards Applicable to Owners and Operators of
Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities; Financial
Responsibility, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,201, 30,202 (1991).
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mechanisms that have long build-up periods. The final report of
the Keystone Center Financial Responsibility Project recognized
that while owners and operators of waste management facilities
should be forced through financial assurance programs to "internalize costs of clean-ups and third-party damages," financial responsibility requirements should "not be counterproductive to
the overall goals and objectives of responsible waste
management." 187
IV.

THE PROMULGATION OF THE NEW FINANCIAL ASSURANCE

MECHANISMS BY STATE AGENCIES IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE FEDERAL

RCRA

STATUTE AND THE

40 C.F.R

PART 258 SUBTITLE D REGULATIONS
Congress sought to ensure the development of new and uniformly applied management regulations for municipal solid waste
landfills through the 1984 amendments to RCRA. Until the enactment of the amendments, the solid waste program under
RCRA had largely consisted of a requirement that states should.
be the ones to develop such plans. A state that initiated a federally approved plan gained the benefits of the Act-financial and
technical assistance to the state and protection for facility operators from citizen suits during the process of upgrading facilities
from "open dumps" to sanitary landfills.
Section 4003 of the 1976 RCRA legislation described the following minimum requirements for state plans: (1) identifying the
relative responsibilities of governmental bodies for the plan's implementation; (2) prohibiting the establishment of open dumps
and providing that solid waste be disposed of in an environmentally protective manner; (3) closing or upgrading open dumps;
(4) establishing state regulatory powers to carry out the plan; (5)
granting local governments the authority to enter into long-term
contracts for the supply of solid waste to resource recovery facilities; and (6) the use of "environmentally sound" disposal techniques. 88 Section 4002(a) required that the EPA promulgate regulations governing the development of these plans. 8 9 None of

187. KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 36, at 4.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(1998).
189. See id. § 6942(b).
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the planning provisions suggested that it would be appropriate to
treat facilities differently on the basis of ownership. 190
The 1976 version of RCRA also provided for the EPA to develop criteria for the disposal of solid waste. A sanitary landfill
was defined as one in which "there is no reasonable probability
of adverse effects on health or the environment from disposal of
solid waste at such facility." 191 Accordingly, an "open dump" was
defined as any facility that does not meet the criteria for a sanitary landfill. 92 The act of open dumping was, in turn, directly
prohibited. 93 The EPA was also charged under § 1008(a) with
the obligation of developing criteria to provide precise regula194
tory controls for solid waste landfills.
Not one word of the 1976 version of RCRA hints at Congressional approval of distinctions between public and private disposal facilities. Indeed, then-Representative David Stockman made
clear the reach of the statute, noting that "the scope of this
bill[] is plenary. It covers every waste site, every junkyard, every
municipal dump in the country, including those on private property."195 Similarly, Congress specifically provided that municipalities that generate and either collect or transport municipal solid
waste, or act as owners or operators of solid waste landfills, must
comply with all applicable RCRA requirements. 96 Direct federal

190. See H.R. 14496, 94th Cong. § 407(b)(1)(1976); See id. at §
407(b)(2); 122 CONG. REc. H11,166 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1976). (statement of Sen. Stafford).
191. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of
1976 § 4004(a), 42 U.S.C. 6944(a) .(1994); See Roger W. Anderson, The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, 1978 Wis.
L. REv. 635, 664-73.
192. See RCRA § 4005, 42 U.S.C. § 6945.
193. See RCRA § 4005(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a).
194. See RCRA § 1008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6907(a); See also 42 U.S.C. §
6944(a); Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities and
Practices, 40 C.F.R. pt. 257 (1990).
195. 126 CONG. REc. H26,759 (1980) (statement of Rep. Stockman). See also 122 CONG. REc. S11,069 (daily ed. June 30, 1976) (statement of Sen. Randolph); id. at Sl1,085 (remarks of Sen. Muskie); 122
CONG. REc. H11,148 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Rooney
and Rep. Skubitz); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491, at 36 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6274-78.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99.
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enforcement was also authorized by the 1976 legislation-the
EPA may act against any "person" determined to be in violation
of any provision of the Act. 197 The term "person" was, in turn,
defined to include any "political subdivision of a State."'' 9 Accordingly, the Act applied to all municipalities, i.e., to every
city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or other public
body created by or pursuant to State law, with responsibility for
the planning or administration of solid waste management, or
an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization or Alaska Native village or organization, and . . .any rural community or

unincorporated town or village or any other political entity for
which an application for assistance is made by a State or political subdivision thereof.199
In 1984, Congress determined that solid waste disposal sites were
deserving of increased federal attention:
Subtitle D facilities are the recipients of unknown quantities of
hazardous waste and other dangerous materials from the disposal of household waste, small quantity generator wastes and illegal dumping. Since construction, siting, and monitoring standards for these facilities are either non-existent or far less
restrictive than those governing hazardous waste disposal facilities, environmental and health problems caused by Subtitle D
2
facilities are becoming increasingly serious and widespread. 00
The 1984 amendments required, in § 4010(c), 20

1

that:

Not later than March 31, 1988, the Administrator shall promulgate revisions of the criteria promulgated under paragraph (1)
of section [4004(a)] and under section [1008(a)(3)] for facilities that may receive hazardous household waste or hazardous
wastes from small quantity generators under section [3001(d)].
The criteria shall be those necessary to protect human health
and the environment and may take into account the practicable
capability of such facilities. At a minimum such revisions for facilities potentially receiving such wastes should require ground
water monitoring as necessary to detect contamination, establish criteria for the acceptable location of new or existing facili-

197. RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928.
198. RCRA § 1004(15), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15).
199. RCRA § 1004 (13), 42 U.SC. § 6903(13).
200. H.R. CON. REP. No. 98-1133, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5688.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 6949a(c) (1994).
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ties, and provide for corrective action as appropriate. 20 2
Nor can the "practicable capability" language of § 4010 justify
a distinction between how private and public landfills demonstrate financial responsibility. The actual language utilized by
Congress is of critical importance. Congress specified that the revised criteria must create standards "necessary to protect human
health and the environment," although the Agency (and, in
turn, States with approved Part 258 programs) "may" consider
the "practicable capability" of solid waste disposal facilities. 20 3 At
a minimum, the Congress insisted that environmental controls
similar to those contained in the Subtitle C regulations-groundwater monitoring, locational requirements, financial responsibility and corrective action measures-be specified.
The reference to "practicable capability" arose in the context
of the development by the EPA of uniform national standardsstandards that were to "avert serious disruptions of the solid
waste disposal industry," 20 4 rather than the implementation or subsequent revision of the regulations by the EPA or by an approved
state. Although the term was not defined by Congress, it is clear
that the unambiguous mandate upon the EPA-and hence upon
any state that seeks to obtain or retain approval of a Subtitle D
program-is to promulgate standards necessary to protect
human health and the environment. To the extent that "practicable capability" enters into the equation at all, the EPA has al-

202. Id. The primary rule of statutory construction is that "the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used." United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985). Generally, the
"plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive ..
" United States
v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). See also Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410,
1417 (9th Cir. 1990). When the plain meaning of statutory language is
evident, the court's inquiry is at an end and the Agency "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. See also
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26, 36 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873
(1977)). Here, the intent of Congress was clear-EPA was to promulgate and ensure the implementation of Part 258 criteria within a specified time frame and apply the requirements to all municipal solid
waste landfills.
203. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
204. 130 CONG. Rec. S13,814 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Randolph).
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ready addressed the issue by creating limited exceptions (which
are discussed below) to the otherwise uniform regulations.
The requirement that the EPA's determinations not be "arbitrary and capricious" 20 5 also supports the view that the Agency
and approved states may not create disparate financial responsibility demonstration procedures. Under § 7006(a), the standard
of review is the same as under § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 20 6 This review requires a "searching and careful inquiry" to ensure that the Agency engaged in reasoned decision07
making based on consideration of relevant factors.
Even if the EPA and approved states otherwise possessed the
statutory authority to create differential financial responsibility
programs, demonstration requirements or "tests" that are available for one sector only would both contradict § 4010(c) and be
arbitrary and capricious. The terms of § 4 010(c) clearly mandate
that the EPA standards be "those necessary to protect human
' 20
health and the environment.
Section 4010(c) of RCRA provides that if a particular form of
regulatory control is necessary "to protect human health and the
environment," reduced levels of protection cannot be tolerated
simply on the basis of the economic impact of compliance upon
any class of facilities. 0 9 Congress emphasized that "It]he underlying standard for facilities subject to this amendment to Subtitle
210
D remains protection of human health and the environment."

205. RCRA § 7006(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a).
206. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a) (i.e., whether agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with the law").
207. See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Union v. Donovan,
722 F.2d 795, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Specialty Equip. Mkt. Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 720 F.2d 124, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 6949a(c). See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (if agency fails to provide a "reasoned analysis" for its decision, the court may not supply
one); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 111
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (agency must supply "reasoned basis" for its actions);
International Ladies Garment Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 814, 815
n.35, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same).
209. See John H. Turner, Solid Waste Regulation Under RCRA, 9 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 6, 9, 42 (1994).
210. 130 CONG. REc. S13,814 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Randolph).
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The Senate Report on the 1984 Amendments expressly provided
that:
EPA must . . . consider the appropriate standards to protect
human health and the environment, taking into account the
size of the facility, its location relative to populated areas and
the degree of industrialization, the proximity of ground and
and the amounts and charsurface water, the disposal method,
211
acteristics of the waste received.
These factors concern the relative degree of risk presented by facilities, not the economic ability of a class of owners/operators to
act, or the governmental nature of certain facilities. Congress
clearly did not desire that the revised Subtitle D criteria impose
unnecessary extensive retroactive requirements-but the statute
also unmistakably provides that the governmental status of the
owner or operator may not be considered in determining
whether a particular form of control is "necessary" to protect
human health and the environment.
Moreover, Congress clearly contemplated-indeed, it looked
forward to-the closure of substandard facilities. As then-Senator
Randolph noted, individual facilities might suffer hardship-and
possibly close-if they cannot meet requirements deemed necessary and practicable for the industry as a whole: "New statutory
requirements for Subtitle D facilities may hasten the closure of
many solid waste facilities that have only a few years of remaining
capacity. The requirements could also precipitate the closure of
facilities with substantial capacity, but that are either unable or
unwilling to accept new regulatory costs." 2 12 While Senator Randolph did refer to the possible "phasing" of new requirements,
neither he nor any other member of Congress singled out any
particular class of facilities as deserving of differential treatment.
Referring to the revised criteria, the Senator stated that:
They may be phased in over time, as the Administrator deems
appropriate, to take account of the practicable capability of the
facilities covered .... The Administrator could phase in new requirements other than groundwater monitoring and corrective
action over time. Phasing may be tailored to the characteristics of
broad categories of facilities. Such phasing might include, for example, imposing requirements first on large facilities which
have the greatest potential for affecting human health and the

211. S. REP. No. 98-284, at 49 (1983).
212. 130 CONG. REc. S13,814 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984).
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environment in the absence of added regulatory controls. Phasing also might include imposing some requirements immediately on existing units but giving time to meet other requirements so that facilities
213
are not faced with all major new requirements at once.

While Senator Randolph spoke of "broad categories of facilities," neither he nor any other member of Congress sought to
permanently insulate any class of facility from the reach of Subtitle
D or otherwise mitigate the impacts of the revised federal criteria on the basis of the nature of their ownership. The congressional history simply suggests that while a temporary "phase-in"
period may be appropriate, the "necessary" long-term protection
of human health and the environment may not be compromised.
The cornerstone of the revised criteria was the impact of new
and existing facilities upon health or the environment; thus the
EPA simply had no choice but to avoid distinctions based on the
purported "economic" capability of owners or operators. Instead,
any "categorization" of facilities was clearly intended by Congress
to be based solely upon the statute's "necessity" requirementand the plain language of § 4010 cannot justify a different approach for any class of facilities.
Indeed, except for the limited exception discussed above, the
Agency made clear that any variation in the' application of the
revised criteria by states must be based-in accordance with §
4010 of RCRA-upon site-specific factors relating to the risks
posed to human health and the environment, rather than generically based on the public or private ownership of the facility:
EPA believes that variation in the control[s] applied to landfills
in different States is appropriate to account for site-specific factors (e.g., hydrology, precipitation). Therefore, today's rule sets
performance standards that allow consideration of site-specific
conditions. EPA agrees that while the Federal standards are
flexible to allow different site-specific controls in different
States, the Federal performance standards should be consistently interpreted from State to State. To ensure that these provisions are consistently interpreted, EPA plans to develop technical guidance for MSWLF owners and operators and State
regulatory officials to enhance uniformity in interpretation of
14
the revised Criteria. 2

213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978,
50,995 (1991).
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Similarly, the EPA noted that while it was "sensitive" to the concerns raised by some municipalities, the final regulations had
fully taken into account those concerns in setting minimum federal standards. The section of the preamble to the final rules referred to above makes clear that any further "distinctions" between facilities must be within the confines of site-specific
conditions rather than based on the nature of the ownership of
the facility. The preamble clearly demonstrates the Agency's conviction that it had, on the basis of a four-year administrative record, included the maximum degree of "flexibility" authorized
by Congress. Accordingly, the Agency's own statements support
the argument that any further dilution of the regulations is not
supported by the "practicable capability" provision in § 4010(c).
For example, the Agency clearly accommodated the concerns
of small landfill operators by establishing phased-in compliance
deadlines governing such things as groundwater monitoring and
financial assurance requirements. Deadlines that were intended
to be applied to facilities without regard to their size or ownership status:
The municipal solid waste crisis comes at a time when local
governments and Indian Tribes are faced with a wide range of
competing demands for their limited financial and technical resources. Schools, roads, social programs, public health and environmental programs, including solid waste management, and
other programs draw on limited local resources, forcing cities
and Tribes to make tough budget decisions. EPA recognizes
and is very sensitive to these difficult conditions that local governments and Indian Tribes face and is carefully considering
the impacts of its environmental programs on local governments and Indian Tribes.
As part of this effort, EPA carefully considered the concerns of local government and Indian Tribes in today's rule for municipal
solid waste landfills. Within the constraints established by Congress,

EPA has provided in this rule extensive flexibility to States, Indian Tribes, and local governments to facilitate implementation.
For example, today's rule sets forth a set of flexible, national performance standards that allow owners and operators, including local
governments and Indian Tribes, to consider site-specific conditions in
designing and operating their landfills to comply with the rule. Today's

rule also establishes a flexible compliance schedule, including
the phase-in of ground-water monitoring requirements over a
five-year period from the date of publication of today's rule. Finally, as discussed later in this preamble, today's rule provides
special relief to small communities and Indian Tribes. Municipal solid
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waste landfills that serve small communities and Indian Tribes which
215
meet certain criteria are exempted from certain high-cost requirements.
The Agency also noted that:
As a general matter, some of the changes in today's rule that
are applicable to all MSWLFs will benefit small landfills. For example, today's rule allows all MSWLF owners and operators
time to comply with the more costly provisions of the revised
Criteria by phasing in ground-water monitoring requirements
over a five-year period beginning on the date of publication of
today's rule. In addition, EPA is delaying the effective date of
the financial assurance requirements until 30 months after publication of this rule, which should benefit small communities.
Finally, today's rule provides that States with approved programs may shorten the MSWLF post-closure care period on a
case-by-case basis. EPA believes that all these measures benefit
216
small MSWLFs.
The nature of the "special relief" afforded to "small communities and Indian Tribes" in § 258.1 (f) merits additional scrutiny. A
review of the EPA's determinations leads to the inescapable conclusion that the narrow exceptions carved out by the Agency-in
conjunction with the site-specific flexible approach endorsed by
the EPA-cannot be squared with a subsequent determination
that many public facilities should, as a class, be entitled to use of
a financial responsibility demonstration mechanism that is not
available to the private sector. The so-called "small community"
exception was narrowly drawn to ensure that facilities not obtain
a permanent and total exemption. The EPA noted that it "tried
to strike a balance between granting relief to the appropriate
small communities versus exempting all small landfills." 217 In the
preamble to the final rule, the EPA stressed the criteria for qualifying for an exemption:
To qualify for this exemption, the landfill must meet the following criteria: (1) The landfill receives less than 20 tons per day
of solid waste on an annual average, (2) there is no evidence of
existing ground-water contamination from the landfill, and (3)
one of the following conditions exists: (A) The landfill serves a
community that experiences an annual interruption of at least
three consecutive months of surface transportation, which prevents access to a regional waste management facility, or (B) the

215. Id. at 50,980 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
216. Id. at 50,990.
217. Id.
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landfill serves a community for which there is no practicable
waste management alternative and the landfill is located in an
21
area that annually receives 25 inches or less of precipitation. 1
Each of the exemption's criteria was developed through careful
consideration of the statutory mandate and the "practicable capability" of small landfill owners/operators. For example,
EPA decided to limit the exemption . .. to small landfills so
long as there is no evidence of ground-water contamination
from the facility because the Agency sees no justification for
providing relief to landfills that are contaminating ground
water.... In the Agency's view, owners and operators of these
landfills should be responsible for taking appropriate corrective
action if contamination is present. . . . Furthermore, today's
rule requires that if contamination is discovered at some future
date, the owner or operator must notify the State Director and,
thereafter, comply with the design, ground-water monitoring,
219
and corrective action provisions in today's rule.
Similarly,
EPA set the 25-nch cap on annual precipitation to ensure that
the exemption would be available only to small MSWLFs where
the risk of ground-water contamination is reduced because of
lessened leachate generation and slower contaminant migration. . . . EPA considered precipitation cut-off values greater
than 25 inches per year, but rejected.them because EPA believes that the risk of ground-water contamination is too great
220
in these areas.
The Agency justified the conditional exemption by emphasizing
the exemption's discrete applicability:
EPA believes that exempting small landfills from the groundwater monitoring and corrective action requirements of today's
rule comports with the statute (i.e., section 4010(c)) and the
Congressional intent for a number of reasons. First, to address
Congressional concern for ground-water contamination, EPA
has narrowly drawn the exemption such that only those small
MSWLFs for which there is no evidence of ground-water contamination are eligible for the exemption (in addition to one
of the other two criteria). Second, as stated above, the exemption is a conditional one such that the owner/operator is no
longer eligible for the exemption when there is evidence of

218. Id. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 258.1(f)(1).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 50,991.
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ground-water contamination associated with the facility. As
such, the facility cannot escape corrective action for known releases. Third, the 25-inch cap on annual precipitation contained in the second criterion ensures that this exemption will
be limited to those small MSWLFs where the risk of groundwater contamination is considerably reduced. Finally, both the
surface transportation difficulties and the "no practicable waste
management alternatives" criteria for obtaining the exemption
reflect the "practicable capabilities" evaluation that the statutory language of section 4010(c) and the legislative history indicate Congress intended EPA to conduct when revising the crite22 1
ria under section 4004(a).
Moreover, the Agency refused, in several other instances, to
grant particular classes of facilities a complete exemption-or
even a variation-from several of the Part 258 requirements. For
example, the EPA declined to define "existing unit" as "the entire, originally permitted landfill area (inclusive of areas not yet
receiving waste on the effective date) . ' 222 Likewise, the Agency
refused to tolerate the recirculation of leachate into a unit that
lacks a composite liner. 223 Finally, the EPA rejected the notion
that existing facilities should be exempt from financial assurance
requirements 224 on the basis that "[t]he Agency does not believe
that owners and operators will be unreasonably burdened by the
'225
costs of obtaining financial assurance mechanisms.
Indeed, the EPA has emphasized that both public and private
municipal solid waste landfills must be subject to Part 258 financial responsibility requirements:
The Agency decided not to exempt any special category of local governments from today's final rule (with the exception of
small landfills qualifying for an exemption in approved states as
discussed above). While the Agency recognizes that local governments may vary in their ability to meet the costs of closure,
post-closure care, and corrective action, the Agency is unable to
support a variance for any type of local government (e.g., cities,
counties). The same concerns that prompted the Agency to include local governments generally apply to these special categories as well. Requiring all local governments to demonstrate financial assurance should encourage appropriate advanced

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id. at 51,041.
See id. at 51,056.
See id. at 51,104.
Id. at 51,105.

1998]

U.S. EPA 40 C.ER. PART 258

619

planning for the costs of closure, post-closure care, and corrective action for known releases by these entities.
The Agency does not believe that the requirements will generally be burdensome to local governments. As discussed above,
the cost of the financial assurance requirements are a relatively
small part of the total cost of compliance with today's rule. Because the requirements will be applied to all MSWLF owners
and operators, regardless of whether they are local governments or private companies, the Agency does not believe that
the requirements will cause a shift from public
to private own26
ership of solid waste management facilities.
Similarly, the Agency stated that it did not believe that Part 258
permitting programs should exclude financial tests:
The provisions of today's rule are intended to ensure the reliability of each mechanism relative to the overall performance
standard. Given the minimum requirements specified, the
Agency believes it is not necessary to limit allowable mechanisms, as some commenters suggested, to cash, surety bonds or
certificates of deposit. The Agency tailored these minimum
qualifications to the particular characteristics and industry practices of the providers of the financial mechanisms (e.g., sureties, banks, insurers, etc.) in order to ensure the effectiveness
of the mechanism as well as the stability of the provider. The
Agency believes this approach is preferable to applying the
same criteria to all types of providers. In particular, the Agency
believes it would be inappropriate to require all providers of financial assurance mechanisms- to satisfy the subtitle C financial
test, which was designed to assess a private corporation's ability
to meet certain costs, not to evaluate the ability of a financial
22 7
service's firm to carry out its business.
In promulgating the Part 258 criteria, the Agency indicated that
it anticipated that the corporate and local government financial
tests "would take effect concurrently" and be available for adop-

tion by states for use in approved programs.2
In addition, the promulgation by state regulatory agencies of a
new or revised financial test/corporate guarantee for private
solid waste facility owners/operators that is based on the EPA
mechanism-particularly in instances in which the Part 258 local
government test based on the EPA mechanism is approved for

226. Id. at 51,107.
227. Id. at 51,115.
228. Id. at 51,115, 51,118.
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use - will ensure that the financial responsibility requirements
significantly more stringent than
for private facilities are not 229
those for non-private landfills.

CONCLUSION

The EPA's Part 258 financial test and guarantees for public
and privately owned or operated landfills were developed with
careful consideration of the goals of the RCRA financial responsibility program. The test and guarantees will help to ensure that
financially viable facility owners/operators have access to costeffective mechanisms for the demonstration of financial responsibility while avoiding the necessity for the costs of closure, postclosure care, and necessary corrective action to be borne by
others. The EPA mechanisms should be incorporated into state
environmental regulations and made available for use by qualified owners/operators.

229. The need to prevent discrimination in the application of the
regulatory requirements to private facilities is another justification for
state agency promulgation of the federal rules. The Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that "(n)o state shall . . . deny to any person within ,its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In particu-

lar, inconsistent standards for public and privately-owned facilities are
at variance with, and cannot rationally be justified in light of, the standard for review of state and local regulation pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

